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Some countries in Latin America have introduced a tax on bank withdrawals 
in order to increase revenue. The debit tax has usually been levied in 
periods of economic turbulence. This paper analyzes the effects of such 
a tax on real cash holdings and on balances of different types of bank 
accounts in Colombia.
The paper analyzes data for the period 1994 to 2007 and then verifies the 
robustness of the model using only the data from 2000 to 2007, thereby 
eliminating the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The results show that 
even though the tax caused a decrease in checking account balances, the 
changes produced in total balances of real cash after 2001 cannot be 
attributed to the debit tax. However, an increase in the rate of growth of 
savings account balances can be attributed to it, suggesting a substitution 
from checking toward savings accounts.
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1.  Introduction
In 1998 the national government of Colombia introduced a tax on any 
financial transaction that involves withdrawing money from a bank 
account. The tax, which is still in effect, was created to alleviate an 
increasing government debt and has changed from 0.2 percent to 0.3 
percent to 0.4 percent of the transaction amount. 
The international economic and financial crisis at the end of the 1990s 
affected countries from Russia to Latin America and produced a 
reduction in the capital flow into Colombia from developed countries. 
Investors became much more cautious. This decreased the amount 
of money in the economy and, as a consequence, interest rates went 
up. Lower investment also increased unemployment, and along with 
a crisis in the housing market, banks were left with a very high level 
of non-performing loans. 
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The debit tax on all transactions from bank accounts was decreed 
the same day the country declared a State of Economic and Social 
Emergency on November 16, 1998. The main purpose of the tax was 
to raise funds to avoid a financial crisis like those experienced in 
Chile in 1985, Venezuela in 1994, and Mexico in 1995. To contain 
the crisis, the Colombian government set some short-term goals 
including increasing the liquidity of the financial sector through 
actions of the central bank and strengthening the bank insurance 
fund (FOGAFIN). The tax in question was introduced in order to 
achieve the latter goal.1 
This paper analyzes data from 1994 to 2007 on real cash holdings, total 
checking account deposits and total savings deposits (savings accounts 
and CDs). Taking advantage of the variations in the debit tax, the data 
set is analyzed in its entirety, and then only for the years following 
the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s. Surprisingly, the results 
show no significant effect on real cash holdings. The debit tax causes 
a significant decrease in checking account balances but no significant 
effect on savings, except for the second difference of savings, which 
shows a positive and significant coefficient beginning in 2000.
Little research has been done previously on the effects of this tax. 
Coelho et al. (2001) highlight general statistical observations, political 
causes of the tax, and general ideas that future researchers should 
keep in mind when studying it. Their analysis looks at similar taxes 
implemented in other countries such as Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, 
and Brazil. Their IMF paper emphasizes the possible serious effects 
of taxing the financial sector (i.e., disintermediation), however, no 
econometric analysis is attempted. Other authors at the Colombian 
central bank, the Association of Banks (ASOBANCARIA), and the Tax 
Administration Department (DIAN) have studied the tax on financial 
transactions but without using econometric tools. There is no previous 
rigorous econometric analysis of which the authors are aware.
Other lines of research, such as that of Rodríguez (2002) and Clavijo 
(2005), focus on the distributional effect of the tax. Clavijo (2005) 
explains the distributional effects of different taxes, one of which is the 
tax on financial transactions. He concludes that the debit tax, contrary 
to the opinions of most politicians and researchers, is not necessarily 
progressive. Those who own large amounts of capital also have access to 
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financial instruments that are not taxed; in particular, they can make 
transactions using accounts outside Colombia. Rather, it is small and 
medium businesses who bear most of the burden. Rodríguez (2002) 
concludes that the tax is progressive, but only for some periods of 
time. In other words, its distributional effect is not consistent. This 
paper contributes to previous research by relying on more years of 
data and by applying rigorous econometric techniques.
2.  History of the tax on financial transactions
In November of 1998 the Colombian government established the 
debit tax. It was announced as a temporary tax (from December 1, 
1998 until December 31, 1999). The rate was set at 0.2 percent on all 
transactions from savings or checking accounts and 0.12 percent on 
interbank transactions, except those with the central bank.
In January of 1999 the tax rate became uniform for all transactions, at 
0.2 percent. Later in the same month, the tax was extended through 
December 2000, and the tax for interbank transactions in national 
currency was eliminated due to its devastating effect on the interbank 
market.2 The following month the government decided that the revenue 
from the debit tax was to be used to rebuild the area of the country 
affected by a devastating earthquake. 
In December of 2000 the tax became permanent and the rate was 
increased to 0.3 percent. This came as no surprise given that the tax 
had become a reliable and easily collectible source of revenue. Three 
years later the tax rate was increased temporarily to 0.4 percent for 
the years 2004 to 2007, and was scheduled to return to 0.3 percent 
in 2008. Instead, in 2006 the increased tax rate of 0.4 percent was 
made permanent. 
In summary, the tax rate was increased three times. The first time, 
in December of 1998, it was increased from 0 percent (nonexistent) 
to 0.2 percent. The other two changes, in January of 2001 (approved 
in December of 2000) and in January of 2004 each consisted of an 
increase of 0.1 percentage points. 
It is important to note that currently some transactions are exempt 
from the tax. Each account holder may choose one savings account 
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from which he or she is allowed to withdraw up to 350 UVT3 per 
month, or approximately 2,748 US dollars (in 1998 dollars).4 Individuals 
with a pension may choose a second savings account in which they 
deposit their pension for an exemption of 41 UVT, equivalent to 322 
US dollars (in 1998 dollars).5 
3.  Theoretical background
Several articles have looked at the general concept of transaction costs 
and their implications for money demand. Some examples include 
Saving (1971 and 1976) and Barro (1976). In this section we will 
adapt the substitution analysis in Saving (1971) to the case of the 
transaction tax. In particular, it is necessary to consider that agents 
may now be substituting among different ways of holding money, as 
the relative cost of using bank deposits has increased. 
The creation of a tax may have two different effects on decision making. 
First, individuals may be substituting away from the use of bank 
deposits in favor of cash holdings, as the relative cost of the former 
has increased. When the exemptions from the tax were introduced for 
savings accounts, this same substitution effect would cause an increase 
in the use of such accounts. Second, the increase in the tax implies 
that individuals have less total income, and hence the total value of 
transactions in the economy might decrease along with the demand 
for all types of money. This income effect occurs when individuals who 
are remunerated through a bank decide to decrease the total amount 
of money withdrawn (as total consumption decreases). 
The substitution effect between using bank accounts or holding cash may 
be very small or nonexistent, depending on whether the use of deposit 
accounts can indeed be substituted for cash. In Colombia, there are 
many fees for using banking services, in addition to the transaction tax. 
Therefore, it is very likely that most individuals using banking services 
do so because they conduct larger transactions for which the use of cash 
is very difficult and even dangerous. Viewed differently, the absence of 
any substitution effect that increases the use of cash is economically 
important because it indicates that agents who really need the banking 
sector inside the country are those burdened the most by the tax. 
3. UVT stands for tax unit value. It is a unit created by the DIAN that changes with inflation and is used 
in tax legislation. The actual value of the UVT amount specified in regulations changes each year. 
4. This is equivalent to approximately 3.500 US dollars in 2007.
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4.  Data
All data was obtained from the central bank of Colombia (Banco de 
la República), except for the inflation rate, which was gathered from 
the Department of National Statistics (DANE). The variables are all 
real with a base period of December 1998. All series are monthly and 
run from January 1994 to December 2007. 
Three measures of money are analyzed: cash holdings, checking 
account deposits, and balances in M2 not included in M1. Based on 
the definition used in Colombia, M2-M1 equates to savings accounts 
and all CDs.
As explained previously, the tax on financial transactions reduces the 
return on bank deposits, which should generate a preference for cash 
holdings and financial investments that are not subject to the tax.6 
This paper evaluates the existence of such a substitution effect, as 
well as the existence of any income effect. 
Previous literature such as Barro (1976) and Labán (1991) has 
recognized the relationship between demand for money, expenditure 
levels, and interest rates. Consequently, this paper is based on a vector 
autoregression (VAR) model that allows all three variables to be jointly 
determined in equilibrium. As real GNP increases, it is expected that 
more money is used to carry out transactions. For this reason GNP 
is one of the dependent variables that is determined together with 
interest rates and money demand. 
However, not only is the general level of production in the country 
relevant, but also who has the money. Because sectors such as industry 
and services tend to have more access to capital sources outside the 
banking sector than production generated in agriculture, the variable 
agro/GNP is included as an exogenous variable to control for the 
percentage of GNP that comes from agriculture. It should be kept 
in mind that this paper evaluates the use of different measures of 
money, which depends on the needs and preferences of various sectors 
of the economy. 
Real minimum wage is also included in the model to control for the 
size of the transactions that most individuals perform. This is because 
the size of the transactions may affect the substitutability of banking 
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services. In Colombia, where most individuals earn the minimum wage 
or less,7 the lower the real minimum wage, the lower we can expect 
the average transaction size to be in the country. 
In addition to the aforementioned explanatory variables, the VAR 
includes the tax rate on financial transactions and the optimal 
number of lags of each dependent variable as indicated by different 
information criteria. 
5.  Econometric models
5.1.  Model A
The first model uses a variable called Dtax which is simply the annual 
change in the tax rate. 
The basic specification is as follows:
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where ȳt is a vector comprised of the following three jointly determined 
variables: the measure of money, the interest rate, and GNP. Ȳt-s  is 
that same vector lagged s months, up to the appropriate number p.8 
The vector Xt includes the exogenous variables, namely the percentage 
of GNP that comes from agriculture and the real minimum wage. 
Dtaxt is the annual change in the tax rate, and Dtax01t is equal to 
Dtaxt × d2001, where d2001 is a dummy equal to one beginning in 
January of 2001. Hence, the effect of the tax beginning in 2001 is 
equal to D + E . et is the error vector.
The interaction term on the tax rate variable is introduced because 
it is possible that the effect of the tax is different beginning in 2001, 
for each percentage point change. In January of that year the tax 
became permanent, the second rate change was introduced (the increase 
to 0.3 percent), and the exemption on some savings accounts took 
effect. If the tax was to be temporary, some individuals might have 
opened CDs with the intention of using that money later when the 
7. There is a large informal (unreported) sector in Colombia. 
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tax had expired, thereby increasing the expected balances of M2-M1. 
A permanent tax could reverse such an effect. On the other hand, 
an exemption for savings accounts reduces the cost of holding bank 
deposits, thereby decreasing the expected substitution effect of the 
tax beginning in 2001. 
The aforementioned VAR model is run four times with the following 
measures of money demand: the rate of growth in real cash holdings, 
the rate of growth of checking account deposits, the second difference 
(D2) of the ln(M2-M1), and a transformed first difference (D) of the 
ln(M2-M1) that is explained in the next section.
9
5.2.  Model B 
Coelho et al. (2001) warn researchers to exercise caution when drawing 
conclusions from data on Latin America for the last years of the 1990s. 
The economic crisis of that period created high levels of instability, so 
isolating tax effects and exogenous macroeconomic changes may not 
be possible. This paper analyzes more years of information, however, 
and the tax rate varied considerably after the 1990s. Even if the effects 
of the tax cannot be separated from the macroeconomic turbulence 
of the late 1990s, it is still possible to learn about these effects by 
focusing on changes in money demand caused by the increase in the 
tax rate after the crisis ended. By 2001, GNP in Colombia was growing 
steadily and the country was more stable politically and economically. 
Thus, to account for a structural change during the period of economic 
turmoil, Model B is included in the analysis. Model B is identical to 
Model A except that the data begins in January of 2000, when the 
first positive GNP growth occurred. 
6.  Preliminary tests
As with any time series data, stationarity must be evaluated. The 
Dickey-Fuller Test with trend and constant is used to determine the 
existence of unit roots. Nonstationary variables are differenced. The 
results of the tests are reported in Table 1. 
In summary, the following variables are established as stationary: the 
first difference of the natural log of real cash holdings (Dln(cash)), 
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which is interpreted as the annual rate of growth of real cash holdings; 
the annual rate of growth in checking accounts (Dln(checking)); the 
difference of the annual growth rate of the interest rate for consumer 
loans (D2ln(r)), hereafter referred to as the “second difference”; the 
second difference of the natural log of GNP (D2ln(GNP)); the annual 
difference of agro/GNP (D(agro/GNP)); and the second difference of 
the natural log of the real minimum wage (D2ln(wage)). 
The annual difference of the natural log of M2-M1, which is 
interpreted as the rate of growth of savings, is not stationary. However, 
second-differencing it to achieve stationarity would compromise 
the interpretation of the coefficients and prevent verification of the 
existence of an income effect or a substitution effect. In this context, 
the second difference is the change in the rate of growth of the 
variable, and it does not indicate whether the variable is increasing 
or decreasing but whether the change occurs faster or slower in 
response to movement of an exogenous variable. For this reason, we 
create a transformed variable by applying a refined Hanning linear 
smoother to the series.
10 The stationary difference between the actual 
10. In Stata, the refinement 3RSSH is used. 
Table 1.  Dickey-Fuller tests
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observation and the smoothed series is used as a dependent variable, 
and interpreted as the part of M2-M1 that is not explained by its 
trend. The second difference is still used in some regressions, despite 
limitations on the interpretation of its results. 
Summary statistics for all variables are found in Table 2. Figures 1 
through 3 display the history of the different measures of money 
demand evaluated in this paper. The three vertical lines in each figure 
correspond to December of 1998 when the tax came into existence, 
January of 2001 when the tax was first increased, and January of 2004 
when the second increase occurred. 
Table 2.  Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dln(cash) 0.1231 0.0527 0.0096 0.2548
Dln(checking) 0.0245 0.1256 -0.2992 0.3015
Dln(M2-M1) 0.0476 0.0797 -0.1103 0.2302
Transf(M2-M1) -0.0001 0.0126 -0.0458 0.0453
D2ln(M2-M1) -0.0004 0.0193 -0.0616 0.0537
Dln(r) -0.0898 0.1993 -0.7456 0.3734
D2ln(r) 0.0045 0.0577 -0.2279 0.2429
Dln(GNP) 0.0308 0.0324 -0.0706 0.0806
D2ln(GNP) 0.0015 0.0090 -0.0379 0.0382
D(agro/GNP) -0.0027 0.0032 -0.0080 0.0050
Dln(wage) 0.0122 0.0163 -0.0198 0.0643
D2ln(wage) -0.0006 0.0057 -0.0440 0.0076
Dtax 0.0333 0.0569 0.0000 0.2000
Dtax01 0.0235 0.0426 0.0000 0.1000 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 65–88
Figure 1. Real cash holdings
Source: Banco de la República, Colombia.
Figure 2. Real checking account deposits
Source: Banco de la República, Colombia.
Figure 3. Real savings account deposits and CDs
Source: Banco de la República, Colombia. M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
The common selection order criteria for determining the optimal number 
of lags of the dependent variables are displayed in Tables 3 through 6. 
A different measure of money demand is used in each table. The tests 
include the likelihood-ratio test (LR), the final prediction error (FPE), 
and the information criteria developed by Akaike (AIC), Hannan and 
Quinn (HQIC), and Schwarz (SBIC). The latter’s tendency to underfit 
is evident for all measures of money demand. The preferred criteria for 
a small sample size are the AIC and FPE, which agree in suggesting 
optimal lags of four when the measure of money demand is real cash 
holdings and two for all other measures of money demand.
Table 3.  Selection order criteria for real cash holdings
(Measure of money demand)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 645.447 5.9e-10 -12.7363 -12.5772 -12.3431
1 691.585 92.276 9 0.000 2.8e-10 -13.4866 -13.232* -12.8574*
2 700.650 18.131 9 0.034 2.8e-10 -13.4879 -13.1379 -12.6228
3 714.073 26.845 9 0.001 2.6e-10 -13.5772 -13.1318 -12.4763
4 729.745 31.345 9 0.000 2.2e-10* -13.712* -13.1711 -12.3751
5 734.964 10.438 9 0.316 2.4e-10 -13.6356 -12.9993 -12.0628
6 743.622 17.316* 9 0.044 2.5e-10 -13.6287 -12.8969 -11.8200
Endogenous: Dln(cash) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP) Exogenous: D(agro/GNP) D2ln(wage) Dtax Dtax01. 
* denotes optimal number of lags.
Number of obs = 99.
Table 4.  Selection order criteria for real checking account 
deposits
(Measure of money demand)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 628.493 8.3e-10 -12.3938 -12.2347 -12.0006
1 677.253 97.519 9 0.000 3.7e-10 -13.1970 -12.9425* -12.5679*
2 688.534 22.563* 9 0.007 3.6e-10* -13.2431* -12.8931 -12.3781
3 691.911 6.7546 9 0.663 4.0e-10 -13.1295 -12.6841 -12.0286
4 696.701 9.5802 9 0.386 4.4e-10 -13.0445 -12.5036 -11.7076
5 701.889 10.375 9 0.321 4.8e-10 -12.9675 -12.3311 -11.3947
6 709.227 14.676 9 0.100 5.0e-10 -12.9339 -12.2021 -11.1252
Endogenous: Dln(checking) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP) Exogenous: D(agro/GNP) D2ln(wage) Dtax. Dtax01.
* denotes optimal number of lags.
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Table 5.  Selection order criteria for real savings account 
deposits and CDs (Transformed)
(Measure of money demand)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 787.566 3.3e-11 -15.6074 -15.4483 -15.2142*
1 805.363 35.595 9 0.000 2.8e-11 -15.7851 -15.5306* -15.1560
2 817.495 24.263 9 0.004 2.6e-11* -15.8484* -15.4984 -14.9833
3 820.897 6.8046 9 0.657 3.0e-11 -15.7353 -15.2898 -14.6343
4 828.914 16.034 9 0.066 3.0e-11 -15.7154 -15.1745 -14.3786
5 834.244 10.66 9 0.300 3.3e-11 -15.6413 -15.0049 -14.0685
6 844.281 20.073* 9 0.017 3.2e-11 -15.6622 -14.9304 -13.8535
Endogenous: Transf(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP) Exogenous: D(agro/GNP) D2ln(wage) Dtax Dtax01. 
* denotes optimal number of lags.
Number of obs = 99.
Table 6.  Selection order criteria for real savings account 
deposits and CDs (second difference)
(Measure of Money Demand)
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 753.305 6.7e-11 -14.9153 -14.7562 -14.5221*
1 768.860 31.11 9 0.000 5.9e-11 -15.0477 -14.7931* -14.4186
2 779.096 20.472* 9 0.015 5.7e-11* -15.0727* -14.7227 -14.2076
3 783.930 9.668 9 0.378 6.2e-11 -14.9885 -14.543 -13.8875
4 788.841 9.821 9 0.365 6.8e-11 -14.9059 -14.365 -13.569
5 795.770 13.859 9 0.127 7.2e-11 -14.864 -14.2277 -13.2912
6 801.309 11.077 9 0.270 7.7e-11 -14.7941 -14.0623 -12.9854
Endogenous: D2ln(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP) Exogenous: D(agro/GNP) D2ln(wage) Dtax Dtax01 
* denotes optimal number of lags.
Number of obs = 99.
7.  Results
7.1.  Model A
Tables 7 through 10 show the effect of the tax during the crisis. When 
the tax was introduced in 1999, it had an important stabilizing effect on 
the financial sector. Its purpose was to generate funds to avoid a financial 
crisis of major proportions, and that goal was achieved. This is evident 
in this data, as three of the four regressions in Model A indicate that 
the introduction of the tax contributed to a consistently higher change 
in GNP growth. In 1999, GNP growth was negative, implying that the  M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
decrease in GNP was smaller than it would have been without the tax. 
Specifically, a 0.1 point increase in the tax rate is associated with an 
increase in the rate of growth of GNP of 0.46 to 0.57 percent. However, 
this effect is short-lived. As soon as the tax becomes permanent, the 
negative sign on the Dtax01 interaction variable eliminates the initial 
effect. Beginning in 2000, the total effect of the tax rate increases on 
the changes in GNP growth rates is statistically insignificant. 
Note that the coefficients on the tax variables reported in Tables 7 
through 14 are not elasticities. This paper measures the relative effect of 
each change in the tax, which was always a 0.1 percentage point increase 
after its introduction; the tax increased from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent 
and then to 0.4 percent. It does not measure the effect of a percent 
increase in the tax rate, because the goal is to estimate the expected 
impact of yet another increase of 0.1 points by the government. 
Cárdenas (2001a, 2001b) shows that real cash holdings have increased 
considerably after the tax on financial transactions was introduced in 
December 1998 (see Figure 1); however, she relies only on statistics. 
According to Table 7, there is no evidence that the tax caused the 
increase. In fact, real cash holdings decreased in response to the 
introduction of the tax, indicating that there was no substitution of 
balances in bank accounts for cash. A 0.1 point increase in the tax 
rate reduced the growth rate of real cash holdings by 1.72 percent. 
Moreover, in Model A there is no increase in checking account balances 
and no estimated effect on savings accounts. Tables 9 and 10 indicate 
that both measures of change in savings accounts were unaffected by 
the tax, even when it was introduced. 
One possible explanation for this result is that the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect, as individuals demanded less of 
all types of money due to fewer transactions. A second, and more 
likely, explanation is that more transactions were performed using 
international markets or other institutions not subject to the tax.
11 
It is possible that some of the balances were directed into illegal 
channels. A series of Ponzi schemes flourished in Colombia in the early 
2000s and started collapsing only in 2008. The “pyramids” collected 
deposits of individuals from all economic classes, with the poor being 
the most affected. After the “pyramids” collapsed, individuals blamed 
11. Inaccuracy in the reports of the amount of money that nationals keep outside Colombia makes any 
data analysis regarding specifics on the outflows of capital highly unreliable. The inaccuracy is largely 
due to tax evasion by nationals who do not report their accounts outside the country. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 65–88
the government and the banking sector because, they argued, using 
banking services had become too expensive. 
The coefficient on the interaction term, Dtax01, is statistically zero for 
the dependent variable representing the growth rate of real cash holdings 
(Table 7). This result indicates that after the tax became permanent, 
increases in the tax did not cause any additional change in agents’ 
behavior compared to their behavior while it was temporary. A plausible 
explanation is that the tax was never perceived as being temporary.
Table 7.  Model A: VAR with Δln(cash) as a measure  
of money demand
VAR w/ Dln(cash)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent variables
Dln(cash) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L4. Dln(cash) -0.3302*** -0.1225  0.0055
L3. Dln(cash)  0.3811***  0.2647 -0.0020
L2. Dln(cash)  0.2165** -0.1510 -0.0340
L1. Dln(cash)  0.5220***  0.1399  0.0257
L4. D2ln(r)  0.1844*** -0.0538  0.0041
L3. D2ln(r) -0.1820***  0.0399 -0.0127
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0734  0.0758  0.0009
L1. D2ln(r) -0.1026  0.2833**  0.0021
L4. D2ln(GNP)  0.9501** -0.8653 -0.0890
L3. D2ln(GNP)  1.0599***  0.0371 -0.0954
L2. D2ln(GNP)  0.1272  0.3687 -0.0694
L1. D2ln(GNP)  0.0036 -0.6644 -0.1103
D(agro/GNP)  1.7525  4.3427** -0.2197
D2ln(wage)  0.8974  1.3213 -0.2389
Dtax -0.1716* -0.1016  0.0464*
Dtax01  0.1086 -0.0403 -0.0699*
Constant  0.0305***  0.0069  0.0017
Pseudo-R2 0.7176  0.3551  0.0982
p-value for F statistic 0.0000  0.0008  0.8965
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*). M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
Model A shows that a 0.1 point increase in the tax rate caused 
a 5.4 percent decrease in the rate of growth of checking accounts 
(Table 8).
12 This may be caused by an income effect; however, the 
tax’s effect on real cash holdings should be of a similar magnitude 
for such an explanation to be plausible. It is more likely that some 
of the transactions previously handled through checking accounts 
are now being performed either outside the country or through other 
channels not subject to the tax. The results suggest that there was 
some disintermediation caused by the tax on financial transactions. Our 
finding is in accordance with statistics recorded previously (Cárdenas, 
2001b and 2002) on the significant decrease in the number of checks 
cleared by the central bank after the tax was created.
Table 8.  Model A: VAR with Δln(checking) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ Dln(checking)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent variables
Dln(checking) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. Dln(checking)  0.2095**  0.2003** -0.0105
L1. Dln(checking)  0.4433***  0.1230 -0.0044
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0195  0.0544 -0.0037
L1. D2ln(r) -0.1107  0.2480*** -0.0027
L2. D2ln(GNP)  0.7894  0.7461 -0.0801
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.2009 -0.5555 -0.1389
 D(agro/GNP)  4.0221**  1.7512 -0.0232
 D2ln(wage) -1.4190*  0.1362 -0.1838
 Dtax -0.5367***  0.1453  0.0348
 Dtax01  0.1027 -0.0124 -0.0687**
 Constant  0.0568*** -0.0240**  0.0032
Pseudo-R2  0.7620  0.4487  0.1304
p-value for F statistic  0.0000  0.0000  0.1165
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*).
12. This effect did not change after 2000. Subsequent increases in the tax continued to have the same 
effect when the tax was permanent as when it was temporary. Again, this can be explained by the tax 
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Table 9.  Model A: VAR with transf(M2-M1) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ Transf(M2-M1)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent variables
Transf(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. Transf(M2-M1) -0.2850***  0.1700  0.0451
L1. Transf(M2-M1)  0.3504***  0.3089 -0.1277*
L2. D2ln(r) -0.0343  0.1032 -0.0065
L1. D2ln(r) -0.0284  0.3655*** -0.0085
L2. D2ln(GNP) -0.3271***  1.0263* -0.0949
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.1465 -0.2862 -0.1520
 D(agro/GNP)  0.0260  3.5960** -0.0748
 D2ln(wage) -0.1110  0.6223 -0.2202
 Dtax  0.0132 -0.2532**  0.0505**
 Dtax01 -0.0386  0.1713 -0.0754***
 Constant  0.0017  0.0158**  0.0015
Pseudo-R2  0.2320  0.3407  0.1477
p-value for F statistic  0.0006  0.0000  0.0575
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*).
Table 10. Model A: VAR with Δ2ln(M2-M1) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ D2ln(M2-M1)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent variables
D2ln(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. D2ln(M2-M1) -0.2943*** -0.2017 -0.0751
L1. D2ln(M2-M1))  0.0004  0.1466 -0.0890*
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0690**  0.1049  0.0003
L1. D2ln(r)  0.0177  0.3643*** -0.0030
L2. D2ln(GNP) -0.1890  0.9543* -0.0880
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.1429 -0.4577 -0.1742*
 D(agro/GNP) -0.2889  3.5222** -0.1489
 D2ln(wage) -0.0785  0.4692 -0.2820*
 Dtax  0.0478 -0.2469**  0.0569***
 Dtax01  0.0591  0.1512 -0.0661**
 Constant -0.0018  0.0165**  0.0011
Pseudo-R2  0.1835  0.3394  0.1682
p-value for F statistic  0.0102  0.0000  0.0223
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*).1 M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
7.2.  Model B
Model B focuses only on observations starting in the year 2000, when 
GNP growth became positive. Since then, the country has been more 
stable economically and politically. Any change in the tax rate during 
this period was a change in a permanent tax.
The results for Model B show that beginning in the year 2000, changes 
in the tax have no effect on real cash holdings (Table 11). The results 
for the growth rate of checking account balances are very similar in 
sign and magnitude to those discussed for Model A. 
The variable Dtax is significant when the measure of money demand is 
the growth rate of checking account balances and the second difference 
of ln(M2-M1) (Tables 12 and 14, respectively). The most important 
difference between Models A and B is the sign of the coefficient of 
Dtax for changes in the growth rate of savings accounts. In Model 
B this is positive, indicating that an increase of 0.1 points in the 
tax rate causes a 1.06 percent increase in the change in the growth 
rate of savings account deposits. This result is consistent with the 
introduction of exemptions for such accounts, as increases in the tax 
cause individuals to substitute away from checking toward savings 
accounts. Because the models are based on the growth rate of checking 
accounts but changes in the growth rate of savings accounts, we cannot 
be sure that the reduction in checking account deposits is offset by 
the increase in savings account deposits. It is likely that although 
some balances were transferred into savings accounts, some actually 
left the Colombian banking system. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 65–88
Table 11. Model B: VAR with Δln(cash) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ Dln(cash)
Lags and exogenous vars 
Dependent Variables
Dln(cash) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L4. Dln(cash) -0.3391*** -0.0724 -0.0152
L3. Dln(cash)  0.4000***  0.3414**  0.0082
L2. Dln(cash)  0.1993** -0.2076 -0.0350
L1. Dln(cash)  0.5227***  0.0960  0.0311
L4. D2ln(r)  0.1699*** -0.0669  0.0071
L3. D2ln(r) -0.1835***  0.0230  0.0004
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0779  0.0762 -0.0270
L1. D2ln(r) -0.0723  0.3551***  0.0172
L4. D2ln(GNP)  0.9832** -0.6641 -0.0421
L3. D2ln(GNP)  1.1292***  0.2101 -0.2529**
L2. D2ln(GNP)  0.0977  1.1303** -0.0488
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.1009 -1.1038** -0.0370
 D(agro/GNP)  1.3839  3.9172** -0.1461
 D2ln(wage)  0.8342  1.5773* -0.3352**
 Dtax -0.0515 -0.1336 -0.0228
 Constant  0.0293***  0.0017  0.0026
Pseudo-R2  0.7208  0.4284  0.1240
p-value for F statistic  0.0000  0.0000  0.5565
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*). M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
Table 12. Model B: VAR with Δln(checking) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ Dln(checking)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent Variables
Dln(checking) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. Dln(checking)  0.2169**  0.2143** -0.0156
L1. Dln(checking)  0.4551***  0.0990 -0.0015
L2. D2ln(r) -0.0035  0.0554 -0.0094
L1. D2ln(r) -0.1268  0.2287**  0.0087
L2. D2ln(GNP)  0.5866  0.6943 -0.0135
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.0239 -1.4055*** -0.0419
 D(agro/GNP)  4.2927**  1.8690  0.0096
 D2ln(wage) -1.3698  0.4617 -0.1674
 Dtax -0.4173***  0.9333 -0.0309
 Constant  0.0553*** -0.0205*  0.0033
Pseudo-R2  0.6808  0.4682  0.0653
p-value for F statistic  0.0000  0.0000  0.6681
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*).
Table 13. Model B: VAR with transf(M2-M1) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ Transf(M2-M1)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent Variables
Transf(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. Transf(M2-M1) -0.3055***  0.0334  0.0971
L1. Transf(M2-M1)  0.3660***  0.3256 -0.1550**
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0391*  0.0956 -0.0124
L1. D2ln(r) -0.0329  0.3397***  0.0006
L2. D2ln(GNP) -0.3782***  1.2633** -0.0442
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.1392 -1.2510** -0.0394
 D(agro/GNP) -0.0254  3.9075** -0.0346
 D2ln(wage) -0.1354  1.1392 -0.2182
 Dtax -0.0260 -0.1219 -0.0198
 Constant  0.0015  0.0196***  0.0013
Pseudo-R2  0.2398  0.3628  0.1068
p-value for F statistic  0.0004  0.0000  0.2441
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*). LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 65–88
Table 14. Model B: VAR with Δ2ln(M2-M1) as a measure of 
money demand
VAR w/ D2ln(M2-M1)
Lags and exogenous vars
Dependent variables
D2ln(M2-M1) D2ln(r) D2ln(GNP)
L2. D2ln(M2-M1) -0.3285*** -0.3722 -0.0356
L1. D2ln(M2-M1))  0.0223  0.2196 -0.1138***
L2. D2ln(r)  0.0735**  0.1048 -0.0071
L1. D2ln(r)  0.0149  0.3455***  0.0089
L2. D2ln(GNP) -0.2299  1.2348** -0.0368
L1. D2ln(GNP) -0.2035 -1.5382*** -0.0550
 D(agro/GNP) -0.3753  3.634** -0.1246
 D2ln(wage) -0.1247  0.8607 -0.2683*
 Dtax  0.1059** -0.1272 -0.0046
 Constant -0.0020  0.0195***  0.0008
Pseudo-R2  0.1915  0.3739  0.1145
p-value for F statistic  0.0068  0.0000  0.1908
Statistically significant at the 1% level (***), at the 5% level (**), and at the 10% level (*).
Figures 4 and 5, respectively, show impulse response functions for 
the growth rate of checking account balances and for changes in the 
growth rate of savings account balances. The growth rate of checking 
account balances decreases in response to an increase in the tax, then 
trends back to the long-run equilibrium. Although the growth rate of 
checking account balances returns to what it was before the tax increase, 
the reduction in account balances is permanent; balances would have 
grown faster for 30 months if not for the tax increase. The change in 
the growth rate of savings accounts exceeds its pre-tax-increase level 
for 30 months before returning to its long-run equilibrium.  M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
Figure 4. Impulse-response for checking account balances
Impulse-response function for the growth rate of checking account balances 
(Dln(checking)) to a permanent 0.1 point increase in the tax rate
Note: The shock occurs in Period 3.
Figure 5. Impulse-response for savings account balances
Impulse-response function for changes in the growth rate of savings account 
balances (D2ln(M2-M1)) to a permanent 0.1 point increase in the tax rate
Note: The shock occurs in Period 3. LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48, No. 1 (MAY, 2011), 65–88
8.  Conclusion
Some countries in Latin America have introduced a bank debit tax in 
order to increase revenue. The tax has usually been levied in periods 
of economic turbulence. This paper analyzes the effects of such a 
tax on real cash holdings and on balances of different types of bank 
accounts in Colombia.
We find evidence of disintermediation, but no evidence of a substitution 
effect from any kind of bank account toward cash holdings. There 
is evidence, however, that the tax does increase the change in the 
growth rate of savings account balances, indicating a substitution 
effect between types of bank accounts. This effect is seen in Model 
B, which considers only data beginning in 2000. 
This paper is not able to measure whether the increase in savings 
account balances corresponds to the entire decrease in checking 
account balances. Nevertheless, the results imply that the tax has 
caused some exodus of money from the financial sector, since the effect 
on checking account balances is large and negative. The presence of 
disintermediation can have serious detrimental effects on the growth 
potential of the country.
Only checking account balances show changes in both models, and 
these are always negative. A complete analysis of the effects of the tax 
on other investments like stocks and bonds is left for future research. 
However, the stock and bond markets in Colombia are rather limited 
and most individuals do not have access to them. Even though interest 
rates in Colombia are now lower due to improved financial and political 
stability, the outflow of capital reduces the amount available for 
investment in a country with extremely high financial services costs. 
The additional increase in the cost of capital generated by the tax 
on financial transactions has introduced efficiency problems into the 
Colombian banking sector. M. Giraldo and B.W. Buckles | THE IMPACT oF FINANCIAl TRANSACTIoNS TAXES
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